According to reports by The Associated Press and various foreign news agencies, vis-à-vis coordination with Libya's Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated political figures, and despite concerns in the West that Al Qaeda-affiliated elements might ascend to the helm of power there, the emir of a prominent militant group (designated a Foreign Terrorist Organization by the US Department of State) is edging closer to securing an official leadership role in Libya's post-Qaddafi era. His rise to prominence should, however, not surprise officials in Washington, both elected and unelected.
Abdel Hakim Belhaj (his aliases count around a dozen) is the co-founder and leader of the purportedly moribund Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG). Today, he is on the short list of candidates whom Libya observers are comfortably forecasting as key political stakeholders in Libya's next government. Still, some onlookers might call their predictions a tad tardy.
In December 2011, I produced a report for members of Congress which called attention to the trajectory of Belhaj's role in the post-Qaddafi era. While his rise to political prominence may be a surprise for some, his historical pursuits should be alarming for all.
Established in Southwest Asia by Libyan jihadis who travelled to Afghanistan to fight the Soviets, despite claiming a country-specific focus for its pursuits the LIFG has been featured prominently in the "global jihad" spearheaded by Al Qaeda.
After enjoying years of hospitality provided by Usama bin Laden in Sudan following his and many LIFG members' decampment from Afghanistan in the early 1990s, Belhaj would become the group's emir. For several years, the group leveraged relations with Al Qaeda and Afghan Taliban leaders to use Sudan and Afghanistan as veritable rear operating bases for the LIFG's operations in Algeria and Libya.
Initially — and although it deployed many of its top fighters trained in Al Qaeda camps in Afghanistan and Sudan to fight in Algeria — the LIFG was focused rather narrowly on pursuing one goal: Overthrowing the "apostate" Qaddafi regime in Tripoli. However, the group's vitriol increasingly incorporated shades of anti-Americanism once the Qaddafi regime put down their revolt in Libya in the late 1990s, and particularly once the US began targeting Al Qaeda after its 1998 dual bombings of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.
For instance, in a letter regarding the U.S. response to these bombings published by the LIFG's political bureau in August 1998, the LIFG pronounced "the U.S.A. is not only an enemy of the Mujahid sheikh Usama Bin Laden and the Islamic movements, but it is an enemy of the Islamic nation"
Before, but mainly after 9/11, various LIFG leaders went on to assume top-ranking positions within the core of Al Qaeda's operations. These transitions, coupled with the two groups' operational proximities, manifest many assumptions about the LIFG functioning as a franchise of Al Qaeda. Of which it was not.
Much of the flawed history about the LIFG stems from a 2007 message featuring LIFG member Abu Yahya al-Libi, who reportedly rose to the number two post in Core Al Qaeda before his death a la drone strike in Pakistan in 2012, and then Al Qaeda deputy commander Ayman al-Zawahiri. The message was widely misinterpreted as an announcement of the LIFG's merger with Al Qaeda. Yet months after its publication — and with little attention from the Western media — al-Zawahiri clarified: "I did not say that [the LIFG] has joined Al Qaeda … However, I said that a group of the notables of the [LIFG] has joined the Qa'idat al-Jihad Group [aka Al Qaeda]. By this, I meant to please Muslims and break the hearts of the enemies of Islam."
Still, regardless of whether the LIFG formally merged with Al Qaeda, history (many specifics of which remain classified in this vein) reveals that in as much as Al Qaeda helped train and equip LIFG fighters, LIFG members helped train Al Qaeda and Afghan Taliban recruits who would engage U.S. forces in Afghanistan following 9/11.
What is perhaps least discussed among officials is that leaked Joint Task Force GTMO detainee assessments reveal one LIFG member's combat prowess was so renowned that an Al Qaeda member traveled to Afghanistan to undergo combat training provided by him for the expressed purpose of preparing for a component of the 9/11 attack plot that was later aborted.
Indeed, in addition to being designated a Foreign Terrorist Organization, according to leaked Joint Task Force GTMO documents, the U.S. Department of Defense has categorized the LIFG in the top tier of lethal terrorist organizations that target U.S. and allied interests.
But it is not the misapprehensions bolstered by inaccurate reporting on the aforementioned 2007 announcement issued by Abu Yahya al-Libi and Al Qaeda's present day leader that have hampered understandings of this obscure group, or its leaders' interests. Rather, analysis of LIFG-related developments has often been clouded by flaws contained in virtually all major media reports about a pivotal event in the group's history.
No, it was not reporting on the captures and renditions to Libya of Belhaj and the group's spiritual leader Sami al-Saadi in 2004 after they fled Southwest Asia via Iran to Malaysia which have fueled ill-conceived notions about the group. Instead, it was reporting on the publication by various LIFG leaders jailed in Libya, including Belhaj and al-Saadi, of a 400-plus-page book of "retractions" in 2009 that led to an abundance of misunderstandings — misunderstandings which no-doubt influenced decisions made by NATO officials who met with Belhaj in Qatar during Libya's 2011 revolution.
Titled "Corrective Studies in Understanding Jihad, Enforcement of Morality, and Judgment of People," the book was authored by LIFG emir Belhaj, LIFG Sharia authority Sami al-Saadi, LIFG deputy emir Khalid al-Sharif, the LIFG's first emir, Abd al-Salam al-Douadi, LIFG founding member Abd al-Wahab al Qayid (the elder brother of Abu Yahya al-Libi), and LIFG military commander Mustafa al-Qunayfid. Given that the book was widely depicted as a repudiation of Al Qaeda and Islamic terrorism in general, it would seem many journalists who covered the release of the LIFG's revisions did not closely review the contents of this material.
For US officials, the LIFG's Corrective Studies should have raised concerns. Its authors sought to "correct" the path of true defensive jihad, not abolish it altogether.
In the introduction section, the authors explained: "it has been the fate of the Islamic ummah in recent generations to face great conspiracies by its enemies, the Jews and Christians ... who conquered its lands, plundered its resources and desecrated its sanctities ... [In response,] many devout [Muslims] have attempted to contribute in one way or another to serving the religion and reviving the ummah. … we wrote this book for the sake of every Muslim who sees the huge gap between what one finds in God's book … and the worrisome situation [experienced] today by some of the sons of Islam … We wrote this book for every mujahid who strives for the advancement of his ummah, and is confronting the external conspiracies with his pen, tongue, money, weapon or prayers." (Translation provided by MEMRI.org)
Echoing the views of such radical clerics as Muslim Bortherhood thought leader and Hamas' so called spiritual guide Yusuf al-Qaradawi — vociferously anti-Semitic high-profile personalities in the Arab world whose imprimaturs were provided for this work prior to its release — authors of the Corrective Studies pronounced jihad is an obligation for Muslims in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Palestine. They argued these places are occupied by foreign military powers and therefore must be liberated through resistance in the form of violent jihad.
It's telling that documents seized by US forces in Iraq indicate that, on a per capita basis, the greatest number of foreign insurgents who arrived in Iraq to participate in the post-Saddam jihad against the American "occupiers" were from Libya. And interviews conducted with an LIFG and Al Qaeda member during Libya's revolution reveal that the recruitment of Libyans to fight in Iraq continued long after the discovery of those documents, and after the publication of the LIFG's "retractions."
It is one thing for Muslim Brotherhood political figures who are assuming control of Egypt to call for the releases of terrorists and terror plot co-conspirators like Omar Abdel Rahman, the so called "Blind Sheikh" who was jailed in the US after being convicted of seditious conspiracy for his role in the 1993 World Trade Center bombings. It is quite another for the leaders of Al Qaeda-affiliated terrorist organizations like Abdel Hakim Belhaj — who, in a letter published on the LIFG's website in May 1997 lauded Omar Abd al-Rahman, demanded his release from prison, and "pronounced the U.S.A. is not only an enemy of the Mujahid sheikh Usama Bin Laden and the Islamic movements, but it is an enemy of the Islamic nation" — to become government officials in a region which is a well spring for violent Islamist extremist movements that target U.S. interests globally.
Belhaj and Sami al-Saadi recently took legal action against the government of Britain for its involvement in their renditions to Libya following their capture by CIA in 2004. And it is unlikely "lawfare" will be the most severe asymmetric tactic Belhaj will be tempted to employ to counter US and allied interests once in a stronger position — even if by covert means.
Under Qaddafi's rule the government of Libya was one of the world's most prolific sponsors of terrorist groups around the globe. If Belhaj and other Salifist jihadis are allowed to claim prominent roles in Libya's government during the months ahead, the post-Qaddafi era might very well retain certain features of the legacy left by the dictator whom Ronald Reagan famously called the "mad dog of the Middle East."
Michael S. Smith II is a principal and co-founder of Kronos Advisory, counter-terrorism adviser to members of the United States Congress, and a senior analyst with Wikistrat Ltd.
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